ing up more "Chinese" than the Chinese themselves. This process of acculturation, or sinicization, as it is sometimes spoken of in the Chinese case, has frequently been pointed to by historians as the underlying reason for the success of Qing rule and continues today to be viewed by some as an essential ingredient in any recipe for alien rule. Since non-Han peoples ruled all or part of China for more than 700 of the last 1,000 years, the question is unavoidably tied up in questions of "Chineseness," nationalism, and ethnic pride.10 The very large number of chaste banner widows in the eighteenth century would seem to furnish further evidence of wholesale Manchu acculturation. In this sense, women's pursuit of a virtuous Chinese female ideal paralleled the loss of martial ability and Manchu language skills among banner males, who became preoccupied instead with pursuing, if not Chinese ideals of literary attainment, then the fine arts of drinking Chinese tea and wine, wearing Chinese clothes, and singing arias from Chinese operas.
Looked at differently, however, the chaste widow "boom" among bannerwomen, and among Manchu women in particular, is more problematic."l Recent research is coming to show that ethnic concerns figured in various aspects of Qing politics to a much greater degree than previously imagined, and we are learning more about the court's long campaign against acculturation-at least, the acculturation of Manchu men. Newer interpretations of Qing history accordingly stress the degree to which maintaining a separate Manchu identity was key to long-term Qing success in ruling China "cosmopolitan" and the "ethnic" modes of rulership,13 the mutually exclusive principles of legitimacy that underwrote Qing power. One element addressed the need to espouse the centuries-old rhetoric of Confucian kingship, the other the need to preserve a separate sphere of interest and influence for the Manchus as an ethnically distinct conquest group. One is reminded of a similar balancing act performed by the Ottoman Turks. Like the Manchus, the Ottomans presided over a polyethnic "universal" empire and yet had to present themselves as protectors of the "faith"-for them, Islam, for the Manchus, Confucianism.14 The premise of this essay is that an examination of the history of widowhood among Manchu women can help us understand one aspect of the accommodation between Confucian universalism and ethnic special interest that has heretofore received very little attention, namely, the operation of gender in the logic of empire. When we trace the history of changing practices among Manchu widows, we find that what was sauce for the goose was definitely not sauce for the gander. The widow was at the center of a complex intersection of ethnicity, politics, and gender wherein behavior that looked Chinese actually was not at first, and wherein Chinese-style norms could be applied in female spheres while they were simultaneously resisted in male ones. The result was that in the Qing period, ethnicity-which, following recent anthropological scholarship, I interpret as a mode of consciousness arising from cultural interpretations of descent that produces a set of relations shaped by specific economic and political forces15-was quite unmistakeably a gendered formation.
The study of Manchu women's history has barely begun. My hope is that by filling in one comer of a larger, but mostly blank, picture, this essay will encourage further work.16 Drawing mainly on Manchu-and Chinese-language archival documents, as well as on Qing official publications, I start by examining the establishment of the cult of virtue among bannerwomen, particularly Manchu women. I investigate the significance of the rising numbers of widows who "preserved their chastity" (Ch., shoujie)17 as compared with the falling 13 These terms are Philip Kuhn's. See Soulstealers, 60. I say more about this issue in my book, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, forthcoming).
14 The difference was that for the Manchus the conflict arose between their own ethnic identity and the cosmopolitan ideals of Confucianism, whereas for the Turks the primary strain was between Islam and the cosmopolitan ideals of Ottomanism, or what Norman Itzkowitz called the "Ottoman Way." There was relatively little tension between Turkish identity and Islam. Thus, in the early twentieth century, when Ottomanism was bankrupted by surging Islamic nationalism, the Turks still had their national identity, but when at the same time in China Confucianism as a state ideology was bankrupted by surging Han nationalism, the Manchus had nowhere to turn.
15 Paraphrasing John L. Comaroff, "Of Totemism and Ethnicity," Ethnos 52:3-4 (1987). The literature on ethnicity is now vast. A good summary is Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives (London: Pluto Press, 1993). 16 The only specialized studies of Manchu women's history I am aware of are those by Lai Huimin and Ding Yizhuang, cited in the notes. I have not found any bibliography on this subject in Japanese or in European languages. 17 An effort has been made to provide original terminology where this is deemed useful. Chinese words are denoted by "Ch," Manchu words by "Ma." number of martyr widows who committed suicide (Ch., xunsi, congxun). A comparison of these two types of behavior reveals that widow suicide among Manchus, far from imitating Chinese practice, was in fact part of a wholly separate Altaic tradition. The eighteenth-century decline of widow-suicide and the popularization of Neo-Confucian chaste widow norms, on the other hand, appears to represent real acculturation among Manchu women. I then consider why this form of acculturation was not only permitted, but encouraged by the Manchu elite, when such a policy was sharply at odds with the court's distinctive ethnic ideal for Manchu men. In the conclusion I ask what this can tell us about women's place in the rhetoric of Manchu identity and about the importance of women in the construction of ethnicity historically.
THE CULT OF THE VIRTUOUS BANNERWOMAN
The sponsorship of Confucian-style virtue by the Chinese state was an institution nearly as old as the empire itself. From the Later Han dynasty (25-220 CE) through the Qing, governments rewarded exemplary moral behavior in men and women by issuing imperial patents and honorific tablets (Ch., jingbiao), excusing honorees from labor service, and, in the Qing, paying for the construction of memorial arches (Ch., paifang) in a widow's home town. The types of righteous behavior the state recognized in dispensing jingbiao changed over the centuries. From an early emphasis on the filiality (Ch., xiao) of sons and daughters, by the Ming period (1368-1644) attention focused above all on widows who remained faithful to their deceased husbands, either by committing suicide or by refusing to remarry, even if the couple had only been betrothed.18 Such widows were celebrated as "chaste wives" or "chaste widows" (Ch., jiefu). A chaste widow in the family could bring considerable prestige to her clan and, indeed, the entire community. For this reason, local histories from the Ming and Qing are crammed with the stories of illustrious women from the county or district, evidence of the outstanding moral fiber of the populace.19 With the gradual cheapening of the jingbiao standard by the late eighteenth century (Elvin's "assembly line"), the social prestige of such recognition declined accordingly. Later in the Qing, the stories of upright women became more and more formulaic until in many instances they were reduced to mere lists of names.
The Manchus first adopted the jingbiao system for recognizing their own widows in 1651, just seven years after the first Qing emperor ascended the throne in Beijing. Approving jingbiao for Manchu and other banner women may well have been one more way (along with burying the Ming emperor, implementing the civil service examinations, and so forth) that the Qing used to underscore their commitment to Confucian virtues and shore up their legiti-macy as masters of the Chinese empire. Given the politics of the day, however, this was a problematic strategy: To commend the sort of fidelity inherent in widow chastity, and especially widow suicide, was to champion a virtue bearing uncomfortably close associations with the still-active Ming resistance, carried on for decades by subjects of the former dynasty who refused to recognize or to serve the upstart Qing.20 It therefore makes sense to think about the other benefits that arose from instituting the jingbiao for bannerwomen.
First, by providing an institutionalized means of recognizing the sacrifices that their women made during the conquest of China, the Qing may have hoped implicitly to demonstrate that Han women were not the only women deserving of praise and that there were virtuous women among the Manchus, too. Moreover, framing that worthiness in Confucian terms made it readily understandable to the Chinese. But it also hid discontinuities between the cultural contexts in which Chinese and Manchu women originally acted. I shall say more about these discontinuities below.
Second, by appearing to promote Confucian virtues among bannerwomen, the court could claim it was promoting ethnic harmony. The memorial announcing that Manchu women were to be considered for jingbiao honors appeared in a long list of rewards, amnesties, and promotions distributed in the announcement that a temple was named for the empress dowager.21 The announcement did not really dwell on female virtues at all, save those of the emperor's mother. Rather, its overall tone emphasized the establishment of ethnic parity and equality between Manchu and Han, promoting the idea of the Manchu emperor as a universal ruler, unbiased and equitable toward all his subjects.22 In other words, by unifying the standards of propriety for Manchu and Han women, the emperor underscored the Qing claim to impartial rule. In the process, he strengthened Qing legitimacy in a different way than a simple, straightforward espousal of Confucian virtues by sending the message that Manchu rule was not only in the best Confucian tradition but that Han Chinese had nothing to fear from Manchu special interests.
At least some Han officials understood the directive in just this spirit. In 1653, the first year that jingbiao distinctions were actually awarded to bannerwomen,23 the censor for the southern province of Guangdong wrote that the emperor's order to reward exemplary behavior among Manchu men and women as he did already among Han was evidence of his benevolence and "equal gaze upon Manchu and Han." Since that was the case, the official took the opportunity to ask, why not go further and eliminate the difference in mourning periods for Manchu and Han officials? If Chinese were required to take a 27-month leave of absence upon the death of a parent, Manchu officials should be required to do the same. Enforcing only a 1-month (later, 3-month) break for banner officials gave Manchus an unfair career advantage, since they did not have to resign their positions, while Han officials did.24 But the court did not unify mourning requirements, proof that however much the rhetoric of "equal treatment of Manchu and Han" was trumpeted; and however much the court showed itself in the "cosmopolitan mode," Manchu privilege-an expression of the opposing "ethnic mode"-was a ubiquitous feature of Qing rule upon which Confucian norms could not be allowed to infringe excessively.
As the Guangdong censor's petition reveals, a double standard did exist, even if the court wished not to publicize the fact. The court neither viewed nor treated Han Chinese the same as it did Manchus and others in the banners.25 Nor, as we shall see, did it treat men and women the same. Thus, while Manchu women might be singled out for their virtue, Manchu men rarely were. As we shall see, much more important for them were the values of "masculine virtue" and associated warrior ways. These gaps between Qing rhetoric and practice caution us to be suspicious of the Confucian overlay of the jingbiao project as it pertained to those in the Eight Banners.26
Before going on to discuss the cult of the virtuous widow in the Eight Banners in more detail, let us first review a breakdown of the statistics concerning meritorious bannerwomen.
These tables help to illustrate three general points. First, when we look at the pattern in widow suicides ( (Table 2. 3). In fact, the percentage was actually slightly higher than this, since among women in bondservant and Imperial Household Department companies was a large number of ethnic Manchus. We lack precise numbers, but it would be fair to say that at least one-half of the 4 percent commended under the booi bondservant category in Table 2 .3 were Manchu women. This raises the total of Manchu jingbiao to 62 percent of the total. Only about 17 percent of jingbiao went to Mongol bannerwomen, with the remainder going to women in the Chinese banners or female Han bondservants. Third, we find an explosive increase in the number of virtuous widows in the Qianlong reign (Table 2. 3). Nearly 80 percent of all bannerwomen cited for jingbiao recognition were cited during the 60 years between 1736 and 1795, and they were cited for refraining from remarriage, not for committing suicide. That the total number of women so honored by Qianlong was more than 10 times the number honored by his father is perhaps not so surprising, since Yongzheng ruled for only 13 years, and since the Qianlong era was a time of ballooning statistics of all sorts. But that the number should be 7 times greater than those honored by the Kangxi emperor, who ruled 1 year longer than Qianlong, suggests that larger changes were at work.
These three general observations-the decline in widow suicide, the statistical dominance of Manchu women, and the chaste widow "boom" in the sec- who is mentioned as "following," nor is it clear that those who "follow" commit suicide. Archaeological evidence from the Neolithic era indicates that accompanying-in-death as an aspect of Chinese royal funerals seems to have had more to do with the practice of human sacrifice in the Shang imperial cult than with any voluntary "following" of the deceased.47 Second-century CE commentators on the Liji understood xun to mean killing someone in order to protect the deceased in the afterlife. The sixth-century Yu pian also spoke of xun as "using people to send off the dead," a meaning still provided in the seventeenth-century Peiwen yunfu dictionary. This sense of xun is manifestly quite close to the sense of the Manchu dahame bucembi. But this xun is not what we mean when we talk about the heroic widow.
The other meaning of xun, that is, xun as martyr, is nearly as old. Basing itself on the pre-Qin Zhuangzi, the same sixth-century Yu pian gives another definition of xun as "giving up one's life on behalf of another," and the Han shu (first century CE) contains the expression xun guo, meaning "to die for one's country."48 By at least the third century CE the phrase xunjie emerged, the suffix jie implying that dying on behalf of someone or something was a moral act deserving of admiration (and emulation).49 It is this sense of xun as "noble sacrifice" that eventually predominated in the language, particularly after the eleventh century, when Song Neo-Confucianists got hold of the notion of fidelity. By the fourteenth century, a woman's loyalty to her husband, though strictly speaking a form of filiality, was indissolubly paired with a man's loyalty to his ruler and official honors for faithful widows began to be routinized through the jingbiao system of rewarding merit.50
By the seventeenth century, when the Ming History was written, the connotations of martyrdom had been firmly fixed in the word for at least 500 years. Wherever xun appears in that text (and it appears often), it refers to the heroic death of either a man or a woman in the name of upright fidelity, frequently to the doomed Ming cause. We find there terms such as righteous martyrdom (Ch., xunyi), faithful martyrdom (Ch., xunzhong), martyrdom for the dynasty (Ch., xunguo, xunnan), martyr's death (Ch., xunsi), or just plain martyrdom (Ch., xun). Indeed, so much had xun come to be identified with the sense of self-sacrifice for a greater cause that the other, plainer sense of "to follow in death," "to be buried with the dead," was virtually lost, at least in talking about the Han Chinese.51 For this reason, when the state wished to recognize and en-noble widow suicide as an act embodying the highest Confucian convictions, xun by itself was no longer serviceable. Instead the official Chinese phrase came to be the pleonastic congxun, meaning literally "to follow follow-indeath," but more likely understood at the time as meaning something like "to follow-die as a martyr."52
In rendering the histories of early Qing women from Manchu into Chinese, it was only natural for translators schooled in the appropriate language for virtuous widows to resort to xun to describe their suicides. But when we look at the way that Manchu widow suicides are spoken of in the Manchu language, we can easily see the problem in thinking of them as xun-suicides in the Confucian sense. Instead of the heroic xun, Manchu texts use the simple phrase, dahame bucembi.53 This expression, as noted, was closer to the older sense of xun, meaning "to follow in death," but lacked the implication of martyrdom so important in the neologism, congxun. The unadorned Manchu phraseology is the best indication that these suicides belonged to a different cultural milieu and were not the acts of martyrs obeying Confucian notions of loyalty. Under original rules, to encourage the younger widow (defined as a woman under forty) to remarry, payment of her husband's pension would be stopped after one year. But after 1727, the incentive for the childless widow under forty to remarry was deliberately raised-she was to receive no pension at all. This was to end the bad habit of some young widows who deliberately chose to "guard their chastity" out of greed.79 The court's clear preference was that banner widows, especially childless young banner widows, remarry. The contrast with standard practice for Han widows could hardly be more stark. I find two principal reasons for this different standard. First, the idea of a widow remaining faithful to the memory of her deceased husband was essentially foreign to the Manchus before the conquest. This is apparent from the term itself. The Manchu phrase for preserving one's chastity, jalangga be tuwakiyambi, is quite transparently a literal translation from the Chinese expression shoujie (to guard chastity). In other words, it was a borrowed term for a borrowed custom. In this it is unlike the expression dahame bucembi, which marked an indigenous practice. Moreover, the native Manchu word, anggasilambi, to be a widow (from anggasi, widow) does not have the same connotations found in either shoujie or shou gua, to preserve widow[hood], which emphasized the importance of guarding (Ch., shou) one's moral purity. So it is not surprising that we find widow remarriage, like following-in-death, was nearly universal in Inner Asian societies. The Turks, Mongols, Khitan, and Jurchen all encouraged widow remarriage, frequently via the levirate, whereby a man's widow was taken as a spouse by his younger brother.80 Though they did not practice the levirate, the Manchus permitted widow remarriage, and among less acculturated Manchu groups in the Northeast widow remarriage remained the rule into the early twentieth century.81 Eighteenth-and nineteenth-century population registers for ban- One can see in the original Manchu standard for widow remarriage itself a kind of dual standard. Whereas women with children or women over forty were free to remarry if they chose, until the 1740s, the court used economic measures to pressure women under forty to remarry. The court's expectations of bannerwomen, so different from those it set for Han women, remind us of the very different status of bannerwomen in Qing society. This point is especially apparent when we consider the economics of widowhood. All widows were "free electrons," to be sure; and all widows faced financial insecurity. But these truths were best applied to the Han woman, who usually remained dependent on her husband's family, frequently with unhappy results.86 Few Chinese widows were independent, since state support only came with jingbiao recognition, by which point a woman had already had to survive twenty or thirty years on her own.87
The bannerwoman, in contrast, was very much the dynasty's ward. The original organization of the Qing state as a warrior society around the Eight Banners imposed upon the dynasty a permanent obligation to provide for the welfare of its soldiers' families. A bannerman lived to serve the khan all his life; when he died, his widow did not face the same sort of terrible uncertainty faced by the members of a Han family, since their needs were addressed in a practical and timely way through the banner system. This obligation was even stronger when it concerned the families of soldiers who had fallen in the field. Depending on the specific circumstances of her husband's death, a Manchu widow could thus count on a one-time cash payment, plus a pension, to be paid for one year, regardless of her age or whether she had children. All told, the wife of an ordinary mounted soldier stood to receive the not-inconsiderable sum of 186 ounces of silver upon his death-roughly fifteen times the average annual wages of a laboring Han Chinese male-or perhaps more, depending on the circumstances of his death.88 If a widow had children to raise, she continued to receive her husband's pension (one-half his last salary) until they were grown.
Though it never said so openly, in allowing remarriage, the court was merely being practical. It was more economical to have widows dependent on second husbands earning a salary and serving the dynasty than to support "idle" widows' families with monthly stipends for which it got nothing in return. By the same token, widows had to be practical, too. The amount provided by a pension was barely enough to live on. Here again, the Manchu widow had options available to her that were not available to the Han woman. One, as discussed, was remarriage; and records show that women cited a wish to escape poverty as their reason for remarriage. could do this found that her family's livelihood would be assured. If she had no son, she could try to get another male in the household into the slot, even if he was not strictly entitled to it.90 Or she could follow proper procedures to adopt a son, who would then be able legally to assume the position of his late stepfather (whom he may never have met) and receive the silver and grain payments that were his due as a salaried bannerman. Any of these actions improved her financial situation and brightened her future and the prospects for the entire household. It is not surprising, then, that such irregular appointments became commonplace during the early eighteenth century. The court even went along with these practices to an extent. In 1736 it relaxed the rules requiring new soldiers to be at least big enough to handle a bow and permitted young boys to take their father's jobs, even if they were only ten years old.91 Nor is it surprising that adoption was frequently resorted to in order to assure a household income. Indeed, while it is known that adoption was (and is) more common in China than in most places in the world, adoption rates among were supposed to return to Beijing in obedience to the standing repatriation policy (literally, return to the banner: Ch., guiqi; Ma., gusa de bederembi). Though an exception to the repatriation policy was made as early as 1687 to allow grown sons to fill their fathers' positions automatically in the provincial garrisons,94 it remained in effect for another seventy years. The banners covered a widow's relocation costs, including the transport of her husband's remains for burial in Beijing. Back in the capital, the true home for everyone in the banners, a widow and her children were expected to find support from relatives if they lacked other means95; but company captains were supposed to ensure their well-being in the last resort.96
Eight Banner officials frequently complained about the burdens entailed by the repatriation policy. Some saw it as expensive and a pointless waste of money, since many long-term residents in the provinces found it impossible to get by in the capital and secretly stole back to family in the garrison.97 Officials began questioning the need to take bodies back to the capital at all, since sons were taking over the jobs anyway. They pointed out the inconsistency of burying bannermen in the capital when bannerwomen who predeceased their husbands were buried in the garrisons,98 noting that repatriation of corpses made it difficult for the family to tend the graves of the departed.99 Under this steady stream of protest, the court gradually relented, first relieving Chinese banners of the need to return to the capital and allowing them to establish local cemeteries in 1742. Over the next fourteen years, it backed down on various other parts of the repatriation policy until finally the entire program was abandoned in 1756.
Maintenance of the repatriation policy on the grounds that Beijing was the native home of bannermen reflected the court's deeper political agenda and its concern over acculturation, while objections and changes to the repatriation policy were predicated on ritual, humanitarian, economic, and practical grounds. These competing pressures disclose the ambivalence of Qing attitudes toward banner widow chastity during the first ninety years of Manchu rule. The collapse of the repatriation policy signified the ascendancy of practical concerns and coincided with a major shift in court policy toward banner widows, whereby the earlier dual standard for younger versus older widows was resolved in favor of an unambiguous promotion of widow fidelity for all women in the banner system. Table 2 .2, the enormous jump in jingbiao statistics suggests either bannerwomen in the middle and later eighteenth century were suddenly much more virtuous than they had been a generation or two before-admittedly unlikely-or that the chaste widow ideal, once unknown among the Manchus, had taken root throughout the banner system. The numbers are just too great to have all been distorted. Indeed, we do seem here to be witnessing the effects of a process of acculturation through which the more proper norms of the chaste Han widow were adopted by women in the Eight Banners. All around them, Han mothers and widows were keeping vows of chastity and earning reputations and awards for their virtue, which then reflected favorably on their sons.101 As widow chastity became more and more common in the eighteenth century and as the Manchu occupation of China dragged on, Manchus were in effect being "left behind" by a prestigious social norm widely respected by the rest of society. It is easy to imagine that people in the banners-like the non-elite members of Qing society generally-began to feel it unseemly that the widows among them could still remarry so easily. Furthermore, given that acculturation was widespread among banner populations, who enthusiastically welcomed Chinese language, literature, art, religion, and food (and often combined them with pre- The other remarkable thing in this 1762 declaration is the emperor's offhand reference to the "consolation" of the widow's "loyal spirit." Here is an entirely Chinese conceit. So far as we know, the Manchu world was not originally troubled by "hungry ghosts" and other sorts of unrequited spirits who restlessly roamed the earth, creating misfortune for the living. Clearly, by the mid-1700's the Manchu elite had absorbed Chinese ideas not just on widow chastity but also on the afterlife. Acculturation, however, still leaves some questions unanswered. If the rise in banner jingbiao citations were the result of acculturation alone, one would expect a slow, steady increase in the number of widows refusing to remarry, rather than a 300-percent jump within the space of a decade. It is hard to resist the conclusion that a second factor-institutional change-had a direct effect on the ballooning number of chaste widows in the Eight Banners. For one thing, policy shifts, such as the 1738 decision to grant greater assistance to young widows, may have lowered the incentive to remarry. Additionally, the court was not applying as much pressure on childless young widows to remarry. It was less concerned about Manchu reproduction, since by this time the demographic situation in the banners had shifted dramatically, and over-, not under-, population was becoming a problem. Also, as just mentioned, the early Qianlong reign saw repeated criticism of the court's repatriation policy. Easing this policy may have helped promote widow chastity. At least one source notes that only after the first banner cemetery was allowed in 1752 did widow chastity be-gin to be reported. One cannot but wonder whether widows felt more compunction over remarrying now that their first husbands were buried close by, rather in Beijing.103
Yet it is hard to believe that cultural, or even institutional, changes can fully explain the tripling in the number of virtuous Manchu widows. A third factor to be considered is the influence of imperial taste. It is quite possible-though at the same time almost impossible to prove-that the Qianlong "boom" represented increased reporting and not only an absolute increase in the number of chaste widows. The potential influence of the emperor in such things should not be underestimated, particularly if the cachet of widow chastity was felt to enhance the image of Manchu women. However, until we have found more edicts encouraging the reporting of chaste banner widows, it will be hard to say to what degree court tastes were responsible for the higher numbers in Table  2 .2. We can say with certainty, however, that under the Qianlong emperor widow chastity in the Eight Banners received far greater attention than it had 100, 50, or even 10 years, earlier. The Qianlong emperor's frequent return to this theme indicates that his message on the importance of the Manchu Way was getting through but poorly. Acculturation continued to take its toll. Martial skills among city-dwelling bannermen hit new lows; ability in the Manchu language withered; horses were slaughtered for soup meat. From a cultural perspective, the differences between conqueror and conquered were fading fast, even as other institutional differences remained. 14 Given this bleak picture for bannermen, it is all the more surprising that acculturation among bannerwomen was not only not resisted but welcomed. There was no "Manchu Woman's Way," not the neat divide between civil and military (Ch., wen and wu) that the court could rely on to separate Han and Manchu men. We see a few signs of court concern over the erosion of cultural differences between Manchu and Han women, limited mainly to the widening of the traditionally narrow sleeves of Manchu clothing. However, neither this nor the embrace of the chaste widow ideal posed a threat to Manchu legitimacy in the same way that acculturation among men did, since women did not fight and so were not involved in maintaining the dynasty's martial image, not to speak of the security of its borders and its defenses against internal rebellion. Much more important was the protection of Manchu fertility. Here Manchu women were in a much safer place then men, since they were not marrying Han men, at least not in significant numbers.15 Again, the banner system saw to that.
In fact, we find that even if there was no explicit "Manchu Woman's Way," there were still important differences between Manchu and Han women. Bannerwomen in Beijing thirteen years and older were required to present themselves for the triennial xiunii selection for palace maids. Girls who had not been through that process were technically forbidden from marrying-a rule sug- sure, but we do find similar rules governing marriage practices. Concern for the preservation and reproduction of power gave rise to prohibitions on the marriage of European (Dutch, English, French) men to colonized women, but colonial men were free to take colonized women as concubines, or "companions." Since European women were not at first allowed in the colonies, by 1900 concubinage became the "most prevalent living arrangement for European colonials."133 In the Manchu case, though Manchu men were able to marry Han women, as discussed earlier, they were usually taken as secondary wives. First wives were usually drawn from clans within the Manchu banners. Manchu-Han commoner intermarriage was therefore "concubinage," too, albeit with a different set of social and legal implications, since the children of such unions were considered unambiguously Manchu, whereas the children of mixed EuropeanAsian unions were not considered European and formed an increasingly important (and, from the colonizers' point of view, worrisome) social group. The ethnic picture looked very different from a woman's perspective, however. When European women were permitted to enter the site of colonization, the result was an increased vigilance of ethnic and racial boundaries between dominant and dominated groups (along with an embourgeoisement of culture and other notable changes). Lines of difference once muted by the fact of widespread cohabitation between European men and indigenous women sharpened as the presence of European women raised concerns about their "protection" from the sexuality of indigenous men. Cohabitation between, say, Dutch women and Javanese men, was out of the question, not to speak of marriage. The sexual double standard thus revealed, colonial concubinage declined, but surveillance of women's behavior remained very strict.134 Like these European women, Manchu women in China faced considerable restrictions on their sexuality and nuptiality. As we have already remarked, they could not marry without the permission of the banner organization and, when they did marry, were prohibited from marrying Han Chinese men, unless they were Chinese bannermen, which made them quasi-Manchus, at least legally.
On the basis of this evidence, one is led to conclude that ethnic identity is not usually threatened by male exogamy (formal or informal), only by female exogamy.135 If this is true, then controlling women's reproduction was indeed a way to secure ethnic boundaries and resolve a major "tension of empire." We can say, therefore, that where the political and economic requirements of empire depend on maintaining ethnic boundaries, different definitions of nuptiality will apply within and between both gender groups and ethnic groups. As in 133 Stoler, "Making Empire Respectable," 637. 134 Ibid., 640-2. It is interesting to note that despite the existence of such restrictions, literary depictions of colonial Indonesia show a very wide range of sexual and marital arrangements between "Europeans," "Mixed Bloods," and "Natives," including the marriage of European females and Native males. See the "Buru Quartet" novels of Pramoedya Ananta Toer. 135 The Jewish case is an immediate and obvious exception.
the Manchu case, this will sometimes produce asymmetric definitions of gender and ethnicity. Turning back for a final look at the Manchu widow, it is plain that few other groups in Qing society were subject to as close and comprehensive regulation as Manchu women. The triennial registers compiled under Eight Banner auspices provided the court with the sort of household information it needed to monitor and manage the marital behavior of all banner populations, the Manchus, as primus inter pares, mattering most. And while this information covered both men and women, it was women's behavior in this regard that was most closely restricted and scrutinized. In part this owed to the growing acceptance of Confucian norms which placed a high value on women's virtue, particularly widow chastity. But, as we have established, Qing imperial interests also insisted that Manchu women's sexuality and nuptiality be closely guarded. This suggests that the Qianlong boom in widow chastity was more than just an effort to acquire Confucian legitimacy, and more, even, than just a leap in the pace of acculturation. Promoting widow chastity affirmed the control of Manchu males over the nuptiality and fertility of Manchu females, giving them further control over the reproduction of banner people and Qing power.
